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ABSTRACT
Although deep generative models such as Defense-GAN [1] and Defense-VAE [2] have made
significant progress in terms of adversarial defenses of image classification neural networks, several
methods have been found to circumvent these defenses [3] [4]. Based on Defense-VAE, in our research
we introduce several methods to improve the robustness of defense models. The methods introduced
in this paper are straight forward yet show promise over the vanilla Defense-VAE. With extensive
experiments on MNIST [5] data set, we have demonstrated the effectiveness of our algorithms against
different attacks. Our experiments also include attacks on the latent space [3] of the defensive model.
We also discuss the applicability of existing adversarial latent space attacks as they may have a
significant flaw.
Keywords Adversarial Defenses, Generative Models
1 Introduction
With the development of deep learning in recent years, research about image classification have made significant
breakthroughs. Models such as ResNet [6] and VGG [7] as well as their variants have achieved amazing accuracy on
image classification tasks. Despite their high accuracy on image classification, neural network based models are often
vulnerable to misclassification given a well-crafted input by an adversary. The differences between these adversarial
examples and original data are often imperceptible to humans, but result in misclassification by the model [8, 9].
Recent research has considered two main attack methods: White-Box attack and Black-Box attack. Under the
White-Box attack scenario, the attackers have access to, at the very least, the classification model as well as the
pretrained parameters. Under the Black-Box attack situation, the attackers do not have any information about the
classification model [10].
Along with attacks, various defenses mechanisms have also been proposed in recent years. The defenses methods
can mainly be divided into three groups [10]: (1) obfuscating the gradient of the classification model [1, 2, 8, 11, 12], (2)
robust optimization such as such as training the classification model with adversarial examples [8] and (3) adversary
detection before feeding images to the classification model [13, 14].
In our research, we focus on the first kind of defense mechanism, gradient obfuscation, and improve upon the
Defense-VAE [2] model. The idea of Defense-VAE is to use VAE’s ability to learn the distribution of input data in order
to transfer the potentially adversarial input data back to the data manifold. In the original VAE framework [15], the
model consists of two parts: an encoder E which maps the input data onto a latent distribution, and a decoder D which
tries to reconstruct the input data based on the variable z sampled from the latent distribution. Defense-VAE leverages
this idea in their defense model and proves that it is a robust way to prevent against attacks. Unfortunately, although
generative defense models such as Defense-GAN [1] and Defense-VAE [2] have achieved decent results on prevent
certain attacks, they have been shown to still be vulnerable to carefully crafted adversarial examples that attack the
latent space of the generative model instead of the classifier directly [3].
The following paper consists of following parts: for theoretical background and related works, please see Appendix
A; in Section 2, we will introduce the research work we are focusing on; Section 3 will be about the experiments and
results while Section 4 discusses future works and concludes the paper. There are additional plots and tables in the
remainder of the Appendix that were not included in the main body of the paper.
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2 Proposed MAD-VAE
We propose modifying the training procedure and introduce several additional loss functions, which help Defense-VAE
to be more robust against adversarial attack [3]. We call our model Manifold Awareness Defense-VAE because our new
training steps attempt to capture the topological structure of the data manifold as well as the latent variables. In the
following subsections, we will first talk about the motivation of our research and then describe our methods.
2.1 Motivation
In order to further mitigate the problem of adversarial attack, we formulate our objective in the following way: we want
the encoded z to represent the input data well while having the decoded G(z) be correctly classified. Since zi follows
a certain distribution for each class i, we want the points zji sampled from this distribution to be close to each other
while maintaining that this cluster is well separated from clusters of other classes. Ideally, our model should be able to
encode the adversarial data X ′, where the benign X data has label i, onto or close to the distribution zi. Therefore,
when we sample from the latent distribution and try to find zji that decodes to similar data, not only will it be less likely
to decode data that lies in the other clusters but also the correct classification can be ensured.
2.2 Specification
We introduce three loss functions that increase the robustness of Defense-VAE through improving the awareness of the
underlying topology of the data manifold. This is a realization of the goals mentioned in the previous section.
2.2.1 Classification Loss
When the classifier gets an input data X , it will extract certainly features from X and make classification based on them.
Since our goal is to make sure that the output of our model can be correctly classified, one straight forward way to
improve the model is to having a classification loss on the output of the VAE G(z). This idea is from GAN (Generative
Adversarial Networks) [16] where we have a generative model G to generate data and a discriminator D to make sure
the generated data is what we want. A similar idea was proposed by Jang et al. [17] for improving the topological
awareness of generative defense models. Specifically, in our case, we have the VAE as our generative model and the
pretrained classifier to be our discriminator model.
During training of the VAE, we fix the parameters of the classifier and feed the output of VAE G(z) to the classifier
to get a classification loss Lc. The new loss function of our model is as follows:
L = Lr + β · Lkl + α · Lc
where Lr is the reconstruction loss and Lkl is the KL-divergence loss in the ELBO equation. α and β are two
hyperparameters of the weight on different loss.
By doing so, we hypothesize that the classification loss can help to coerce the VAE model to generate features that
are sensitive to the classifier, and at the same time, force the latent z to lie in the cluster of zi for each class i.
2.2.2 Proximity and Distance Loss
According to Zhao et al. [18], due to the nature of MNIST, it would be hard for a model like our own to learn a clear
separation between classes and as a result the latent distributions of z will certainly mix with each other. In order to
solve this problem, we decide to add another explicit loss to constrain the latent variables. Similar to the idea from the
research conducted by Mustafa et al. [19], we try to learn the center ci of the cluster of zi for each class i and, at the
same time, keep the clusters away from each other. The proposed loss of function can be described as follows:














α · Lp − σ · Ld
]
where k is total number of labels in the dataset and the distances are computed by the euclidean distances. α and σ are
the weights between the proximity loss and distance loss respectively. Therefore, the loss function for our VAE model
becomes:
L = Lr + β · Lkl + Lpd
where the variables are the same as those above. The idea of this loss function is to force the latent variable zi with the
same label i to gather together towards the center ci while make sure ci and zi is farther away from the center of cluster
of zj where j 6= i. Through the adversarial training on our defensive model, we are pushing the decision boundaries
between each cluster to better separate the classes.
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2.2.3 Combined Loss
Since we have discussed two new loss functions for generative defense models in the subsections above, it would be
natural to think of a way to combine them together in order to utilize both their advantages. A naive approach to the
aggregation of the two defense loss functions would be to design a weighted sum. To do so, we use the combined loss
below for our VAE model:
L = Lr + β · Lkl + γ · Lc + Lpd
where Lr is the reconstruction loss and Lkl is the KL-divergence loss in the ELBO equation. β and γ are two
hyperparameters controlling the weight assigned to the different loss functions.
3 Experiments
We compare our methods against the original Defense-VAE model, however, it may be noted that our model does
not use any of the Defense-VAE’s code base. Through our reproduction of Defense-VAE, we were able to match the
performance detailed in the Defense-VAE paper [2], therefore validating its functional equivalence.
We evaluate our defensive model under the FGSM, Rand-FGSM and CW white-box attacks as well as three
other attack methods not included in our training process: PGD [20], momentum iterative FGSM [12] and single
pixel attack [21]. We also evaluate MAD-VAE and Defense-VAE under the Overpowered Attack [3]. Although the
Overpowered Attack is technically a white-box attack, it is a latent space attack and therefore it is not reasonable to
compare it against other white-box attacks. Instead, the Overpowered Attack gets its own section, after Black-Box
Attacks.
Our classifier and MAD-VAE implementation are written using the PyTorch [22] library and we use the open source
package AdverTorch [23] for performing various attack methods. The Overpowered Attack is also written in PyTorch
and is largely based off of the code provided by Jalal et al. [3].
We use the MNIST dataset [5] for our experiments, which contains 60,000 training images and 10,000 testing
images. We generate a large, combined training dataset using three attack methods: FGSM, Rand-FGSM and CW
with three different parameter settings for each one of them. We then use another parameter setting to generate the
validation dataset to evaluate the performance of our models, and we use the testing data set to get our test dataset for
all the six attack algorithms mentioned above. Since the attack generating process is stochastic, it is rare for non-empty
intersections of different dataset to occur.
Due to time limitations and the computational complexity of the models, we have not been able to fully reproduce
the experiments conducted in Defense-VAE [2] and Defense-GAN [1]. Our defense model, however, remains based
on the architecture of Defense-VAE and is able to match the Defense-VAE [2] accuracy without any of our additional
loss functions. The structure of MAD-VAE can be found in Table 4 in the Appendix. In our experiments, we choose
the classifier MagNet [24] to be our classification model. MagNet’s model structure can be found in Table 5 in the
Appendix.
The original Defense-VAE model converges after 5 epochs while our model, with the new loss functions the
proximity and distance loss variant converges after 5 epochs, while the other variants converge after 10 epochs. In
order to achieve the best performance, we validated our model on a validation data set for different parameter settings.
From our experiments on the validation set, we chose the weight of our loss functions as: α = 0.01, σ = 0.00001,
β = 0.1 and γ = 0.1. The other parameters setting are kept the same as Defense-VAE paper. We use the Adam and
SGD optimizers for our gradient descent with a exponential learning rate scheduler.
3.1 Results on White-Box Attack
In this section, we will present the results on White-Box attack using six different attack methods: FGSM, Rand-FGSM,
CW, MI-FGSM, PGD and Single Pixel. All of the adversarial images are generated using the AdverTorch [23] package
with default parameters. The results are shown in Table 1.
Attack No Attack No Defense Vanilla Classification Proximity and Distance Combined
FGSM 0.9931 0.1316 0.9675 0.9899 0.9836 0.9905
Rand-FGSM 0.9931 0.1521 0.9734 0.9914 0.9862 0.99
CW 0.9931 0.0075 0.9772 0.9906 0.985 0.9914
MI-FGSM 0.9931 0.0074 0.963 0.989 0.9816 0.9887
PGD 0.9931 0.0073 0.9725 0.9883 0.9827 0.988
Single Pixel 0.9931 0.9977 0.9845 0.9887 0.9877 0.9887
Table 1: Classification accuracy of different models under different attacks with the default parameters. The models are
trained on the data generated using the first three attack methods while the other three attacks are not included in the
training dataset. Highest accuracy per attack is in bold.
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We note that the attacks are successfully fooling the classifier except for the Single Pixel attack. Table 1 demonstrated
that our methods make the original Defense-VAE more robust under all the six attacks. Additionally the model utilizing
Classification loss outperformed the others on most of the situations with the Combined loss outperforming under the
other attacks. Unlike what was does in the Defense-VAE paper, we did not fine-tune the classifier based on the output of
out model. Through our topologically aware training, we consistently outperform Defense-VAE on the tested white-box
attacks.
3.2 Results on Black-Box Attack
In this section, we present the results of our experiments of MAD-VAE compared with the vanilla Defense-VAE on the
FGSM Black-Box attack. As what is mentioned above, attackers will have no access to the classifier information under
the Black-Box attack scenario. They thus training a substitute model for generating attacks. The detail of substitute
models can be found in Table 6.
In Table 2, we present our classification results for different substitute classification model from the Defense-VAE
paper [2]. For all the experiments, we set the FGSM parameter ε to be 0.3 which is the default value given by the
original paper. From the table, we can spot that the Black-Box FGSM attack can reduce the classification accuracy
of different classifiers to only 5 percent. All models, including Defense-VAE, perform well on the Black-Box FGSM
attacks. However, the Classification loss model and Proximity & Distance model outperform Defense-VAE by several
percentage points.
Substitute No Attack No Defense Vanilla Classification Proximity and Distance Combined
A 0.9939 0.0487 0.9615 0.9792 0.9698 0.9774
B 0.9925 0.0144 0.9513 0.9726 0.9632 0.9704
C 0.9938 0.0546 0.9653 0.9741 0.967 0.966
D 0.9812 0.0173 0.9319 0.9419 0.95 0.9387
E 0.9807 0.0155 0.9305 0.946 0.9528 0.9389
Table 2: Classification accuracy of different models based on the FGSM Black-Box attack on various substitute models
with ε = 0.3. Highest accuracy per substitute is in bold.
3.3 Results under the Overpowered Attack
The Overpowered Attack [3] is a powerful adversarial attack that targets the latent space of generative models. In
the paper by Jalal et al., the authors use the Overpowered Attack to reduce the accuracy of Defense-GAN to 3%.
Defense-VAE is not only supposed to be a faster alternative to the online-optimization of Defense-GAN, but also
provides a more robust defense generative model. Because there is some noise induced by the generative defense
models, attacks with different noise robustness parameters were performed both in Jalal et al. experiments and our
experiments. Because this attack is a latent space attack, the classifier cannot be directly targeted to yield a baseline
accuracy, hence we trained a standard “Identity” VAE on MNIST.
We measured the performance of the defensive models under two metrics. In the paper by Jalal et al., they measured
the accuracy of the classifier to be the number of digits such that the classifier correctly classified the digit under all
noise robustness parameters, referred to as “Original Accuracy” in our results. On the other hand, we also measured the
accuracy of the classifier on the combined pool of adversarial images, regardless of the noise robustness parameters,
which we refer to as “Accuracy”. The results from the Overpowered Attack experiments can be found in Table 3
Metric Identity Vanilla Classification Proximity and Distance Combined
Accuracy 0.3078 0.4443 0.386 0.4345 0.3885
Original Accuracy 0.199 0.335 0.273 0.329 0.284
Table 3: Classification accuracy of different defensive models under the Overpowered Attack. The meaning of the two
metrics is explained above. Highest accuracy per metric is in bold.
From Table 3 we can see that under both our accuracy and the original accuracy metrics, the vanilla Defense-VAE
outperformed all MAD-VAE variants, although the Proximity & Distance variant came within 1% of the accuracy of
the vanilla Defense-VAE. These results are initially very startling due to the decrease in adversarial robustness of the
MAD-VAE models in comparison to the Defense-VAE model – we expected that the MAD-VAE accuracy would either
increase or remain the same relative to Defense-VAE’s accuracy. The intuition for this is seeded in Section 3.5 in which
we plot the distribution of these adversarial data points, both in latent and ambient space.
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3.4 Clustering for White-Box Attacks
In this section, we will show the clustering of the adversarial examples, latent variables, and VAE output images using
the Uniform Manifold Approximation and Projection (UMAP) [25] dimensional reduction technique. Clustering of
VAE output images can give us a direct sense of the classification result, where images with same label tend to be
close to each other. Similarly, since we are trying to cluster variables in latent space, it is helpful to use clustering
figures to help us evaluate the results. Since we have four models in total, in the following plots we will denote vanilla
Defense-VAE as A, Defense-VAE with combined loss as B, Defense-VAE with proximity and distance loss as C, and
Defense-VAE with classification loss as D.
Since the experiments in the previous section show the strong performance of our MAD-VAE model endowed with
the classification loss functions, due to the limited space we decided to only show the clustering plot of that model in
this section. Additional plots for other defensive models and adversarial attacks can be found in the appendix.
Figure 1: Clustering plots of the benign test dataset.
Figure 1 is the clustering of original MNIST test dataset, from which we are able to see that images of digit 6 and 0
are well separated from others although there have some points have similar characteristics and lie in the wrong clusters.
The images of digit 9 and 4 are mixed with each other due to the similarities of certain features in the images, while
other clusters are close to each other but still well separated.
(a) FGSM attack. (b) Rand-FGSM attacks (c) CW attack.
Figure 2: Clustering plots for adversarial examples
Figure 2 is the MNIST clustering of data and predicted labels generated from three attacks: FGSM, Rand-FGSM
and CW. From the figure, we can still see clustering of the data, however, the clustering does not correspond to classes
like in 1.
In the following two groups of plots, we will show the clustering of the output of our Defense-VAE model with the
classification loss function as well as the latent variables z. Since our goal is to achieve data manifold awareness during
training, we are hoping to spot clustering in our data and latent variables.
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Figure 3 shows the clustering result of the output from Defense-VAE with classification loss on adversarial data.
The colored labels of Figure 3 are predicted using the classifier. From this figure, we are able to see that the output
of our model is clearly clustered by color, whereas the adversarial input (Figure 2) is not. Although some of the data
with different labels are still mixed, it overall demonstrate the potential ability of the model to remap data back to the
original data manifold.
(a) FGSM attack. (b) Rand-FGSM attacks (c) CW attack.
Figure 3: Clustering plots of output from MAD-VAE with classification loss across different attack methods.
Figure 4 shows the clustering of the latent variable z in the classification MAD-VAE. Since we are adding the
classification loss with respect to the latent variables in our new loss function, we would hope to see the clear separation
of latent variables compared to the vanilla Defense-VAE.
(a) FGSM attack. (b) Rand-FGSM attacks (c) CW attack.
Figure 4: Clustering plots for latent variables of the MAD-VAE with classification loss given adversarial examples as
input.
3.5 Clustering for Overpowered Attack
For the clustering of Overpowered Attacks, we feel like it would be most representative of the attack to plot only one
noise robustness set at a time. Therefore, in this section we only present the clustering for the Overpowered Attack with
a noise robustness term of 1.0. Additionally, our plots will focus on the Overpowered Attack against the proximity and
distance loss MAD-VAE, since the effect of the adversary is most pronounced under this model.
Figure 5 shows the clustering of the output generated by the Overpowered Attack when attacking MAD-VAE with
proximity and distance loss. In contrast to Figure 3, we see that there is no obvious clustering structure associated with
the underlying MNIST dataset. This is due to the fact that instead of attacking the ambient space of the classifier, the
Overpowered Attack instead attacks the latent space of the defensive model. Intuitively, if the latent space accurately
models the underlying data manifold of MNIST, then latent variables that lie outside of the learned manifold do not
necessarily have to follow the underlying clustering when decoded.
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Figure 5: Adversarial clustering under the Overpowered Attack on MAD-VAE with proximity and distance loss.
In the next two plots, we will look at the effect of the Overpowered Attack on the latent variables of the defensive
models. For clarity, we have split the original data and the adversarial data plots into two separate plots, though they
should be viewed together. Figure 6 shows the latent embedding of both the original data and the adversarial data
generated by the Overpowered attack.
(a) Unperturbed data clustering (b) Overpowered Attack clustering
Figure 6: Clustering plots for latent variables of the MAD-VAE with proximity and distance loss. First figure is original
data and second under the Overpowered Attack.
What we can see from Figure 6 is that the Overpowered Attack tries to pull the original data points towards other
clusters of data. The decoded images of the perturbed data are therefore more similar to other classes of numbers.
The moving out data out of well-defined clusters towards other points could explain why Defense-VAE outperforms
MAD-VAE in these tests, as Defense-VAE has a less structured latent space, as is shown in the Appendix Figure 9.
This, however, remains pure conjecture.
3.6 Comments on the Overpowered Attack
By exploiting the latent space of defensive models, the Overpowered Attack [3] is very effective at finding what
traditional literature on the subject considers adversarial examples. The traditional methodology surrounding adversarial
examples is to find some adversarial perturbation under some `2 distance budget from the original data point. It is
natural to limit adversarial examples in this way since it prevents examples from becoming too noisy and defeating the
“imperceptible” nature of adversarial examples.
While the methodology of limiting perturbations under some `2 distance makes sense for ambient space attacks, for
latent space attacks on defensive models, this methodology falls apart. The Overpowered Attack is one adversarial
example generation method that seems to abuse this `2 constraint. How does one abuse a distance metric? Well, latent
space attacks abuse how inadequately the `2 norm represents perceptual distance. The problem imposed by the `2
norm surfaces as the adversarial example often being perceptually of a different class, although it originated from
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perturbing an image of a different class. Figure 7 demonstrates this failure of the `2 norm, although there exists many
more examples.
(a) Unperturbed MNIST Data (b) Overpowered Attack Data
Figure 7: Original and perturbed MNIST data under Overpowered Attack. `2 difference of 3.8232.
The implications of the phenomenon of latent space attacks transmuting an data point of one class to another raises
some issues about how we measure the effectiveness of latent space attacks, and whether they can be used at all. In
terms of creating defenses for latent space attacks, it is difficult to gauge accuracy since it is hard to know what images
have changed human perceptible classes. Similarly, it is difficult to perform adversarial training (either strengthening a
classifier or a defense model) because this attack may introduce incorrectly classified images as true. One possible
solution may be to constrain the `2 distance further, or perhaps to use a different metric altogether. I leave this problem
of latent space class transmutation as an open problem to the reader.
4 Conclusions and Future Works
In this paper, we propose the MAD-VAE model which improves upon the robustness of Defense-VAE through three
new training loss functions. While applied here to Defense-VAE, our loss function and methodology is not limited to
any model and can be applied to any generative model based defense algorithms. We empirically show that our methods
are more effective against various attack mechanisms than Defense-VAE.
The only attack method which MAD-VAE does not improve upon the accuracy of Defense-VAE is the Overpowered
[3] Attack introduced by Jalal et al. While empirically our method fails to outperform Defense-VAE, in this paper we
have raised concerns as to the applicability of the Overpowered Attack and other latent space attacks in their current
state. It is possible that our drop in accuracy is due to an increase of images in which they have been transmuted to a
different class.
An aspect that worth delving into would be adapting our training methods to other models such as Defense-GAN.
Since it is training a GAN is not an easy task, it was not feasible to complete it within the limited time-frame given to
do this research. Additionally, the choice of different hyperparameters is also worth tuning for a longer period of time.
In order to achieve better performance, a larger training data set could be generated and could be used to better tune the
hyperparameters. Additionally, additional research on latent space attacks could shed more light on avoiding the class
transmutation problem.
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Appendices
A Related Work and Background Information
We have based our research on Defense-VAE and made some improvements using different loss functions and training
methods. Before talking in detail about our work, we will discuss different attack and defense algorithms first as well as
introduce VAE and Defense-VAE in detail. Finally, we will mention the problems and drawbacks of current research.
A.1 Attack Methods
There are various attack algorithms haven been proposed. All of these attacks can be summarized in the following form:
x̃ = x+ η where x is the original data and η is the perturbations being added. Most of these attack methods aim to find
the minimum perturbation η which is undetectable by human beings but result in misclassification of the classifier.
A.1.1 White-Box Attacks
In the White-Box Attack scenario, the attackers will have full access to the classification model and the pretrained
parameters. Therefore, the attackers can utilize the gradient of the model J(θ) to design attack algorithsm. Similar to
the attack methods being used in Defense-GAN [1] and Defense-VAE [2], we are using three major attacks: FGSM
(fast gradient sign method) [8], r-FGSM (random fast gradient sign method) [26] and CW (Carlini-Wagner attack) [27].
Fast Gradient Sign Method is proposed by Ian Goodfellow [8], where the attack is achieved by taking a single step
in the direction of gradient of the classification model. The perturbation added to the image is η = εsign(∇x(θ, x, y)).
Randomized Fast Gradient Sign Method is an enhanced attack algorithm [26] based on the FGSM attack.
Instead of directly getting the gradient on the original image data x, r-FGSM added random noise on the image
x′ = x + α · sign(N(0d, Id)), and then doing the FGSM attack on the generated image x′: xadv = x′ + (ε − α) ·
sign(Jx′(θ, x
′, ytrue)).
Carlini-Wagner attack is a powerful attack [27] and it result in 0% accuracy of the classifier under most of the
circumstances. The attack is performed by solving the following optimization problems [27] [1]:
min
δ∈Rn
= ||δ||p + c · f(x+ δ)
s.t. x+ δ ∈ [0, 1]n
where f is an objective function that will result in the misclassification of the model and c is a constant.
A.1.2 Black-Box Attacks
Under the scenario of Black-Box attack, the attackers will have no access to the classification model. Therefore, it is
often much more difficult for the attackers to perform successful and efficient attack on the model. In most of recent
research works, two main methods have been proposed [10]: (1) find substitution models which will resemble the
classifier, then use the the original White-Box attack methods [28], and (2) another method is to use efficient query
methods by estimating the gradient from model output or repeatedly randomly adding certain perturbations [29].
A.2 Defenses Algorithms
In addition to the release of numerous attack methods there has also been extensive research into defense mechanisms.
Although there are many of them, we will only introduce two major algorithms in the following subsections.
A.2.1 Adversarial Training
One of the major ways to make classification model more robust against different adversarial attacks is to augment the
training data set. The process of training classification model on a integrated data set of benign data and adversarial
examples generated using different adversarial models is called adversarial training [8]. Although this method has been
proved to be somewhat useful for defending attacks from attacks that are used to augment data, it is still vulnerable
when facing a different attack that is not included in the combined training data set.
A.2.2 Deep Generative Models and Denoising
Another popular method is through leveraging the phenomenon of exploding and vanishing gradients in deep neural
networks [10]. By first inputting the image into a generative model such as PixelDefend [30] or Defense-GAN [1]
before performing classification, the combined model is deeper and thus is subject to exploding and vanishing gradients.
Additionally, the defense model is able to transfer the adversarial example back to the benign data manifold and thus,
these generative defensive models can be viewed as a certain type of purifier. This is the method that is utilized in
Defense-VAE [2].
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A.3 Variational Autoencoders (VAE)
Variational Autoencoders (VAE) are powerful generative models based on the ideas of Autoencoders and variational
inference. The model consists of an encoderQ(z|X) and a decoder P (X|z). The encoder tries to encode the information
of input data X onto a latent variable z, while the decoder aims to completely reconstruct the data X using the latent
variable z.
In order to maker sure our encoder successfully approximate the posterior P (z|X), we should calculate the






















We want to maximize the term on the left, since the KL divergence should be close to 0 if we want our z to be good
enough to reproduce the data. The two terms on the right hand side (ELBO: evidence lower bound) can be optimized
using gradient descent: the former one measures how well we reconstruct the original data, and the latter one bounds
the latent z’s distribution to the real probability distribution P (z) which we usually assume it to be standard normal
distribution.
A.4 Defense-VAE
The original VAE model is not suitable to be used in adversarial defenses, since we do not want to reconstruct images
still containing the information of perturbations. In order to solve this problem, Defense-VAE modifies the encoder and
decoder as follows [2]:
z ∼ Enc(X̃) = Q(z|X̃), X ∼ Dec(z) = P (X|z)
where X̃ = X + η is the adversarial example created by adding perturbation η on the original data X . Since the





where the input of Defense-VAE are the adversarial examples while the output are the corresponding benign data.
The training process of Defense-VAE is very straight forward: we just need to use different attack algorithms to
generate adversarial example based on the clean data thus creating a training pair. In reality, since we can use any attack
methods with various parameters, we are able to generate large number of training data.
A.5 Problems and Drawbacks of Current Research
Despite the best efforts of the respective authors, the state-of-art gradient obfuscating defense algorithms such as
Defense-GAN [1] and Defense-VAE [2] are still vulnerable to adversarial attacks [3] [4]. Given a certain input image
X , an attack can find another input X ′ which is ε-close to the original data X that the classification output C(X) and
C(X ′) are significantly different. Therefore, if such (X,X ′) pair exists, then we can find a pair of z accordingly:
(z, z′) where X ∼ G(z) and X ′ ∼ G(z′), yet C(G(z)) and C(G(z′)) are much different. Such attack method can be




s.t.||G(z′)−G(z)||22 ≤ (2η + ε)2
where L is some loss function, ε is the perturbation distance bound and η is the distance bound between the generated
data manifold G and the real image manifold.
In their paper, Jalal et al. [3] proposed the Overpowered Attack which is based on this formulation, resulting in
decreasing the accuracy of Defense-GAN to only 3%. In addition, they also proposed the according defense methods:
adversarial training with the Overpowered Attack, which makes the model powerful against PGD (projected gradient
descent attack, another popular White-Box attack) [20].
There are a couple advantages to the approach proposed by Jalal et al. Firstly, by searching for adversarial pairs in
the typically much lower-dimensional latent space of the defensive model, the optimization problem of maximizing
the classifier loss is made significantly easier. Secondly, due to searching in the latent space of the defensive model
as opposed to the ambient space, the adversarial images that are captured are endowed with much more relevant
information as opposed to noise.
12
A PREPRINT - NOVEMBER 4, 2020
A.6 Topological Structures in Adversarial Defense
In an effort to formalize the problem of adversarial examples while using defensive models, Jang et al. [17] suggest
a underlying cause for adversarial examples and offer up a solution. Jang et al. proposes that the existence of such
adversarial examples stems from the lack of understanding of the topological structure of the underlying data manifold.
Simply put, the learned data distribution does not match the true data distribution, and thus there exists images that do
not get mapped back to the data manifold by the defense model.
Jang et al. prove a theorem which states that if the latent distribution is composed of nZ multivariate Gaussian
distributions and the data manifold is composed of nX components, if nZ < nX then there exists points outside the
data manifold that are part of the approximated data manifold of the latent dimensions. In our proposed model, we use
some of the methods they introduced in the October 2019 version of their paper in order endow our model with better
topological awareness. Since then, the paper by Jang et al. has undergone some drastic changes, which would be worth
looking at in the future.
B Neural Network Architectures
The details of the models used in our paper and experiments are listed in the following three tables.
Encoder Decoder
Conv(*, 64, 5, 1, 2) + BN + ReLU FC(128, 4096) + ReLU
Conv(64, 64, 4, 2, 3) + BN + ReLU ConvT(256, 128, 4, 2, 1) + BN + ReLU
Conv(64, 128, 4, 2, 1) + BN + ReLU ConvT(128, 64, 4, 2, 1) + BN + ReLU
Conv(128, 256, 4, 2, 1) + BN + ReLU ConvT(64, 64, 4, 2, 3) + BN + ReLU
FC1(4096, 128), FC2(4096, 128) ConvT(64, 64, 5, 1, 2) + BN + ReLU
Table 4: Model structure for Defense-VAE [2]
Layers Params
Conv.ReLU 3 × 3 × 32
Conv.ReLU 3 × 3 × 32
Max Pooling 2 × 2
Conv.ReLU 3 × 3 × 64
Conv.ReLU 3 × 3 × 64




Table 5: Model structure for classifier [24]
A B C D, E*
Conv(64, 5 × 5, 1) Dropout(0.2) Conv(128, 3 × 3, 1) FC(200)
ReLU Conv(64, 8 × 8, 2) ReLU ReLU
Conv(64, 5 × 5, 2) ReLU Conv(64, 3 × 3, 2) Dropout(0.5)
ReLU Conv(128, 6 × 6, 2) ReLU FC(200)
Dropout(0.25) ReLU Dropout(0.25) ReLU
FC(128) Conv(128, 5 × 5, 1) FC(128) Dropout(0.5)
ReLU ReLU ReLU FC(10) + Softmax
Dropout(0.5) Dropout(0.5) Dropout(0.5)
FC(10) + Softmax FC(10) + Softmax FC(10) + Softmax
Table 6: Model structure for Black-Box attack classifier [1]. * indicates same structure without dropout layer.
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C Additional Plots for Experiments
In this section, we will provide the clustering plots of model output and latent variables that have not been included in
the sections above.
(a) FGSM attack. (b) Rand-FGSM attacks (c) CW attack.
Figure 8: Clustering plots of output from vanilla model across various adversarial inputs.
(a) FGSM attack. (b) Rand-FGSM attacks (c) CW attack.
Figure 9: Clustering plots for latent variables of the vanilla model given adversarial examples as input.
(a) FGSM attack. (b) Rand-FGSM attacks (c) CW attack.
Figure 10: Clustering plots of output from model trained with proximity and distance loss across various adversarial
inputs.
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(a) FGSM attack. (b) Rand-FGSM attacks (c) CW attack.
Figure 11: Clustering plots for latent variables of the model trained with proximity and distance loss given adversarial
examples as input.
(a) FGSM attack. (b) Rand-FGSM attacks (c) CW attack.
Figure 12: Clustering plots of output from model trained with combined loss across various adversarial inputs.
(a) FGSM attack. (b) Rand-FGSM attacks (c) CW attack.
Figure 13: Clustering plots for latent variables of the model trained with combined loss given adversarial examples as
input.
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